When Treaty Rejection Becomes the Negotiating Position
THE CLAIM: The Independent's reporting, citing 'security analysts,' suggests that Trump's rejection of Putin’s offer to extend the New START treaty creates a 'more dangerous environment with a higher risk of miscalculation.' The implication is that this decision introduces novel instability. THE EVIDENCE: The New START treaty, signed in 2010 and extended in 2021 by the Biden administration, capped
deployed strategic nuclear warheads and bombs at 1,550 for both the US and Russia. This limitation, often referred to as 'numerical parity,' has been a cornerstone of US-Russia arms control for decades. However, the US National Security Strategy (NSS) under both Republican and Democratic administrations, particularly since 2017, has increasingly voiced concerns about China's nuclear expansion and
Russia's development of novel, non-accountable strategic weapons. A 2023 Congressional Research Service report notes that US strategists have long held that extensions of existing treaties without addressing these 'third country' or 'new technology' issues are insufficient (CRS, 2023). THE CONTRADICTIONS: Trump's rejection, while framed as a sudden move, aligns with a consistent trajectory of US
strategy, not an aberration. This is not the first instance of a US administration declining to extend or withdrawing from foundational arms control agreements. In 2002, the George W. Bush administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, citing a need for missile defense capabilities unconstrained by the treaty. This withdrawal, like the current rhetoric around New