When 'Peace Deals' Signal Pivot, Not Resolution
Volodymyr Zelenskyy's recent remarks, alleging U.S. intentions to 'do business with Russia' despite ongoing military actions, are not an isolated concern. They fit neatly into a decades-long pattern where calls for 'peace' serve as a diplomatic prelude to significant realignments of power and economic interests, often at the expense of local populations and stated principles. FIRST INSTANCE: The
'Pragmatic Turn' in Proxy Conflicts The concept of U.S. 'pragmatism' on the global stage, often framed as 'damage control' or 'realpolitik,' has historically emerged when geostrategic costs begin outweighing perceived benefits. Consider the 1970s and 1980s in Afghanistan . Following the Soviet invasion in 1979, the U.S. initially backed the Mujahideen as freedom fighters (Project Cyclone,
1979-1989). However, by the late 1980s, with internal political shifts and mounting costs, the focus subtly shifted. By 1988 , Gorbachev signaled Soviet withdrawal, and the U.S. became an advocate for a 'political settlement,' which, from the perspective of local Afghan resistance, often felt like a step back from full support, paving the way for future instability. REPETITIONS: 'Re-engagement'
and 'Rapprochement' This playbook reappeared with varying degrees of transparency. In the context of Syria, post-2015 , as Russia deepened its involvement, segments of Western policy opinion began to advocate for 'de-escalation zones' and 'reconciliation' with the Assad regime, even as atrocities continued. While not a direct 'business deal,' this represented a willingness from certain quarters to