War Profiteers and the Humanitarian Facade in Sudan
THE ACTORS: Who benefits from the chaos? The primary belligerents are the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. Both leaders gained prominence post-Omar al-Bashir, with significant foreign backing. Beyond them, several regional states and international entities play critical, if often
obscured, roles. THE FUNDING: Where does the money come from, and what is its true cost? The RSF, originating from the Janjaweed militias responsible for atrocities in Darfur (2003-08), built its financial empire on gold mining operations, primarily in Jebel Amer, Darfur. A 2019 report by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) detailed how RSF-linked companies control large swathes of
Sudan's gold market, bypassing state oversight. This illicit gold trade funnels significant revenue directly to Hemedti’s network. Furthermore, the RSF and SAF have historically supplied mercenaries to conflicts in Libya and Yemen, often paid in foreign currency by regional powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, enriching their leaders and providing combat experience. The Sudanese transitional
government in 2020 officially sanctioned legislation to nationalize gold resources; however, enforcement has been weak, allowing the profiteering to continue unabated. THE INCENTIVES: Why maintain the conflict? For the RSF, the conflict ensures continued control over lucrative gold mines and other extractive industries. For the SAF and its allies, maintaining instability prevents democratic