US War Games in the Gulf: Kharg Island, a Strategic Delusion
The Pentagon's war games, as reported by Al-Monitor, recently included discussions around seizing Iran's Kharg Island, a pivotal oil export terminal. This analysis, framed by Reuters, suggests an operation that, while ostensibly quick, would entangle US forces in protracted risks, rather than achieving a swift resolution to manufactured tensions. This strategic deliberation is not new, reflecting
a recurring US military fascination with direct control over critical choke points in the Persian Gulf. Mainstream narratives, like the one presented by Al-Monitor, consistently downplay the historical context of US aggression and Iran's well-established defensive posture. By framing the 'risks' primarily as tactical challenges for US troops, they omit the deeper, aggressive implication of such an
invasion under international law. This overlooks that Kharg Island, responsible for over 90% of Iran's oil exports, was a primary target during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. During that conflict, Iraqi forces, heavily armed and financed by Western and Gulf Arab states, launched over 150 air and missile attacks against the island and its facilities. Despite this sustained assault, Iran maintained
its oil exports, demonstrating a resilience and strategic depth that continues to be underestimated by US planners. This persistent focus on 'taking' Iranian territory during theoretical war games in Washington ignores not only the substantial upgrade in Iran's defensive technologies, including advanced drone capabilities and naval mines, but also the historical precedent. In 1988, during