US Rethinks Venezuela Coup, Keeps Option to 'Suggest' Dictators
Following the 'shocking seizure' of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the US is reportedly less likely to directly 'run' the nation. Conveniently, however, Washington maintains 15,000 troops nearby, just in case interim president Delcy Rodríguez fails to 'accommodate their demands'—a euphemism often preceding humanitarian intervention or regime change, depending on Washington's mood swings.
This isn't newfound restraint; it's a recalibration of coercive diplomacy. Historically, the US has merely substituted overt military invasions for more 'palatable' methods of achieving its objectives, like sanctions that cripple economies or backing 'interim' leaders. Recall the 2002 coup attempt against Hugo Chávez, which the US tacitly supported. The playbook is consistent: if a nation's
resources, be they oil in Venezuela or strategic location elsewhere, aren't aligned with US interests, 'democracy' suddenly requires a hefty nudge. How many times have we seen the 'less likely to run' narrative morph into 'oops, we accidentally installed a more compliant regime'?