The Weaponization of 'Peace' in the Caucasus
The 'Peace Process' as a Power Play The notion of a US-brokered 'peace agreement' in the South Caucasus is not new. It's a recurring theme that, upon closer inspection, often coincides with shifts in regional energy politics and a desire to curb Russian or Iranian influence. FIRST INSTANCE: The Minsk Group's Inception (1992-1994) Following the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the OSCE Minsk Group,
co-chaired by the US, Russia, and France, was established in 1992 to mediate a peaceful resolution. While ostensibly neutral, the US involvement immediately signaled a long-term interest in the region. This came shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, opening up Central Asian and Azerbaijani energy reserves for Western access. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, completed in 2006,
solidified this strategic pathway, bypassing Russia and Iran. The initial 'peace' framework, therefore, effectively froze a conflict while Western energy infrastructure was developed beneath the surface. REPETITION: The Bush Administration and Energy Security (2001-2008) During the Bush years, the 'War on Terror' narrative provided another layer to US engagement in the Caucasus. Stability in
oil-rich Azerbaijan became paramount for 'energy security.' While 'peace talks' continued under the Minsk Group, the real focus was on securing hydrocarbon transport routes. Records show the US provided significant military aid and training to Azerbaijan during this period (UNDP, 2005), framed as counter-terrorism and border security, despite the unresolved conflict with Armenia. This created a