The Selective Conflation of Faith and Fanaticism
CASE A: Attacks by non-state actors in specific geographic regions. The Independent, reporting on the Nigerian village massacre, states, 'Extremists massacred 162 people in a Nigerian village after issuing a call to prayer.' The language emphasizes the group's 'extremist' nature and the perversion of a religious act. This framing implicitly links the violence to a specific religious identity, even
without explicitly naming the group (though other reports might mention Boko Haram or ISWAP). The focus remains on the *ideology* as the primary driver, rather than examining state capacity, resource conflicts, or historical grievances. The article does not delve into the Nigerian government's counter-insurgency failures, which have been documented by organizations like Amnesty International
(2020), showing a consistent pattern of civilian protection deficits by state forces in the region. CASE B: State-sponsored or proxy violence, particularly by Western allies. Consider the coverage of the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre, where Lebanese Phalangist militias, allied with and enabled by the Israeli military, slaughtered thousands of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in refugee camps
in Beirut. While initial reports did condemn the militias, the framing largely shielded the Israeli state, despite the Kahan Commission later finding then-Defense Minister Ariel Sharon indirectly responsible for the massacre. The term 'extremist' was rarely applied to the state actors or their direct allies, instead focusing on 'militias' as rogue elements, despite documented collaboration. Nor