The Perennial 'Deal' With Iran
Senator Marco Rubio recently speculated that Donald Trump's preference would be to strike a deal with the Iranian government. This overture follows a familiar pattern in Washington’s foreign policy rhetoric, where engagement with Iran is consistently framed through the lens of a potential, often elusive, agreement. This is not a new script; the idea of 'containment' through a deal with Iran dates
back at least to the 1979 revolution, when initial attempts to manage the new Islamic Republic's foreign policy were quickly supplanted by punitive measures. Fast forward to 2015, the Obama administration secured the JCPOA, a multilateral agreement designed to curb Iran's nuclear program. Yet, within years, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from this verifiable deal in 2018, imposing
what it termed 'maximum pressure' sanctions, a move which coincided with a reported 24% increase in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile by 2019, according to the IAEA. The recurrent invocation of a 'deal' often functions as a preparatory step for either escalated confrontation or, conversely, a rhetorical olive branch to justify maintaining sanctions. Historically, every US administration since
President Reagan has, at various points, either called for or pursued some form of negotiation, only to impose or maintain sanctions, which have cost the Iranian economy an estimated $1 trillion since 1979 in lost oil sales alone. This cycle reveals a double standard: the US routinely demands concessions while consistently moving goalposts or undermining established agreements, such as withdrawing