The Perennial 'Bad Faith Negotiator' Playbook
FIRST INSTANCE: The Korean War Era (1951) During the Korean armistice talks, the US military and intelligence agencies consistently cast North Korea and China's negotiating positions as purely tactical maneuvers designed to rebuild forces or gain propaganda advantage. General Matthew Ridgway's forces, for instance, frequently argued that the communists were 'unprepared for honest negotiation' and
only sought 'to gain time' (New York Times, 1951). This narrative served to prolong the conflict and justify escalating military pressures rather than seeking immediate de-escalation. The outcome? A protracted, grinding war that eventually settled into an armistice, but only after millions of casualties. REPETITIONS: Vietnam Peace Accords (Late 1960s - Early 1970s) As peace talks lurched forward
in Paris, US intelligence assessments, often leaked to the press, routinely framed North Vietnamese participation as a cynical ploy. Henry Kissinger himself, while publicly pursuing peace, privately expressed doubts to President Nixon that Hanoi was 'negotiating in good faith' and was instead 'stalling for time' (National Security Archive, 1972). This narrative, often amplified by figures like
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, helped to maintain domestic support for continued bombing campaigns and military escalation, including the secret bombing of Cambodia, rather than allowing for a genuine diplomatic resolution. The war continued for years, ending only when the political will to fight evaporated. REPETITIONS: Iranian Nuclear Deal Negotiations (2000s - 2015) Throughout the various rounds