The Nuclear Deal's Enduring Double Standard
The New Arab's report highlights Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's assertion regarding increased 'flexibility' from both Washington and Tehran on the nuclear issue, specifically mentioning US willingness to 'tolerate Iranian enrichment within clearly set boundaries.' This phrasing echoes diplomatic efforts to manage the discourse around Iran's nuclear program, often relying on proxies or
indirect statements to signal potential shifts. CASE A: Current Framing of Iran's Nuclear Program The report frames recent 'flexibility' from the US as a positive development, suggesting a readiness to accept some level of Iranian enrichment. This is presented as a concession, implying that Iran's enrichment is inherently problematic unless 'tolerated' by external powers. CASE B: Historical
Precedent of Nuclear Tolerance The historical record shows a stark double standard. Pakistan's nuclear program, for instance, developed covertly with imported technology, achieving weaponization capability by the late 1980s. Despite severe sanctions initially, the US later lifted many of these after 9/11 for geopolitical cooperation in the 'War on Terror.' This normalization of an undeclared
nuclear program, unlike the continuous pressure on Iran's declared, IAEA-monitored program, reveals a clear disparity in application of non-proliferation standards. Furthermore, Israel's unsafeguarded nuclear arsenal, estimated at 80-90 warheads since the 1970s, remains unacknowledged by the US and other global powers, despite its refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)