The Inevitable Scapegoat
The New Arab reports Gallant, formerly a confidante of Netanyahu, accusing the Prime Minister of fabricating narratives related to the October 7th attack. Gallant's charge—that Netanyahu is attempting to deflect responsibility onto intelligence and security officials—is not an isolated incident but a recurring feature of Israeli political life when facing severe criticism. CASE A: The Current
Accusation Gallant claims Netanyahu knew of the intelligence warnings regarding Hamas’s increased capabilities, yet systematically avoided discussing the issue. The exact quote attributed to Gallant, “Netanyahu is not telling the truth about everything that happened regarding the October 7 Hamas attack,” is designed to undermine the Prime Minister's credibility directly. This framing positions
Netanyahu as a deceptive leader, seeking to scapegoat subordinates. CASE B: The Agranat Commission and the Yom Kippur War Compare this to the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Following massive intelligence failures and initial military setbacks, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan faced intense public scrutiny. The Agranat Commission of Inquiry, established in November
1973, was tasked with investigating the events. While the commission found severe deficiencies in the intelligence and operational readiness, and recommended the removal of several high-ranking military officers, it largely *cleared* the political leadership, including Meir and Dayan, of direct responsibility for the failures leading to the war (Agranat Commission Report, 1974). The framing then