The Gulf's Persistent Nuclear Plea
Here's what they buried in paragraph 3: FIRST INSTANCE: The Initial Accord and Regional Reservations (2015) The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in July 2015. While framed as a diplomatic achievement by the Obama administration, regional powers including the UAE and Saudi Arabia expressed reservations. Their concern was not just Iran's nuclear ambition but its regional
footprint, which they felt the JCPOA did little to curtail. They sought broader security assurances, often via increased US military commitment in the Gulf. REPETITIONS: The Post-Withdrawal Appeals (2018-2020) Following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 under the Trump administration, the UAE's approach became nuanced. Initially aligning with the hardline US stance, by late 2019 and
into 2020, as tensions escalated significantly (e.g., attacks on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019, attribution contentious but widely blamed on Iran; the US assassination of Soleimani in January 2020), calls from Abu Dhabi for de-escalation and diplomatic engagement with Tehran became more prominent. This shift signaled a recognition that maximum pressure was leading to maximum instability,
rather than compliance. (RAND Corporation, 2020) REPETITIONS: The Biden Era and Negotiations Restart (2021-2023) With the Biden administration's stated intent to re-enter the JCPOA, the UAE continued to advocate for a deal, but with a critical caveat: any new agreement must address Iran's ballistic missile program and its regional proxies. This was a direct response to the perceived limitations of