The Gulf's Golden Handcuffs
First Instance: Economic 'Aid' as a Political Tool The use of financial aid and investments to sway geopolitical alliances is not new. Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states significantly increased financial assistance to Egypt. Records show that between 1973 and 1979, Egypt received over $10 billion in aid from Arab states (World Bank Data, 1980). This period
coincided with Egypt's shift away from the Soviet Union and rapprochement with the US, culminating in the Camp David Accords. The 'aid' was explicitly tied to political realignment, punishing Egypt for its separate peace with Israel by many Arab states, then slowly re-engaging. Repetitions: Post-Arab Spring Stabilizations and Sanctions The playbook resurfaced prominently after the 2013 military
coup in Egypt, which ousted President Mohamed Morsi. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were immediate and substantial financial backers of the new Sisi government. Within months, Gulf states pledged over $20 billion in aid and investments (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). This financial injection shielded Sisi’s government from immediate economic collapse and international pressure, cementing its
alignment with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Compare this to the West's reaction to other coups, where sanctions and aid cuts are common, demonstrating a clear double standard when US and Gulf interests align. Another instance emerged following the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis, where Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar. Egypt's participation was widely seen as a direct