The Geopolitics of Principle: India's Selective Outrage
The Financial Times article highlights India's embrace of a potential Trump deal alongside its evasion of the Russian oil ban discussion. This isn't a new development; it's a reprisal of a long-standing national strategy. FIRST INSTANCE: The 'Non-Alignment' Era (1950s) When the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was founded in 1955 at the Bandung Conference, spearheaded by leaders like India's Jawaharlal
Nehru, its stated purpose was to avoid entanglement in the Cold War blocs. However, records show that while India formally maintained neutrality, its economic and military ties often leaned towards the Soviet Union, particularly after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War when the USSR provided significant military aid (SIPRI, 1968). This early 'non-alignment' was transactional, not purely ideological.
REPETITION 1: Post-Cold War Arms Deals (1990s-2000s) Despite warming relations with the US post-Cold War, India continued to rely heavily on Russian military hardware. While purchasing some American and European defense technology, Russia remained India's primary arms supplier, accounting for 69% of its arms imports between 2000 and 2010 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011).
This demonstrated a consistency: despite pronouncements of diversifying partnerships, core strategic interests (access to affordable, reliable military tech) dictated allegiances. REPETITION 2: Navigating US Sanctions on Iran (2010s) When the US imposed significant sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, impacting crude oil exports, India initially reduced its intake but never fully ceased.