The Geopolitics of Permanent Scrutiny
The Hill's plea for enduring congressional backing for AUKUS is, frankly, adorable in its predictability. One might wonder why a pact ostensibly about 'free and open Indo-Pacific' needs such hand-wringing over mere funding. The answer, as always, lies in history's echo chamber. FIRST INSTANCE: The First Great Unveiling (1960s-1970s). While AUKUS is about nuclear subs, the underlying mechanism –
securing long-term defense contracts through political pressure – is ancient. Consider the deployment of the F-111 fighter-bomber. First touted in the early 1960s (Wikipedia), it was sold as a revolutionary, cost-effective solution for multiple service branches and allies. The sales pitch was about 'interoperability' and 'deterrence.' The reality? Skyrocketing costs (far exceeding initial
estimates, per the GAO 1971 report) and a deeply flawed design that only saw limited export success to, you guessed it, Australia and the UK. The key: securing congressional funding and commitment early meant it was too big to fail, regardless of performance. REPETITIONS: The Perpetual War Machine's Payday (2000s). Fast forward to the early 2000s and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, now
known as the F-35. Launched in 2001 (Lockheed Martin), it was again pitched as a cost-efficient, multi-role solution for allies. The 'congressional support' mantra was deafening. The program became a textbook example of cost overruns and delays, with an estimated lifetime operating cost now projected at over $1.7 trillion (Bloomberg, 2021). Yet, early and sustained congressional backing made it