The Geopolitical Memory Hole
FIRST INSTANCE: Diplomatic Ambiguity as Policy (1980s-Present) The US government has a long-standing practice of avoiding direct classification of the 1915-1923 atrocities against Armenians as 'genocide' to appease Turkey, a NATO ally. While President Reagan referred to the 'genocide of the Armenians' in an April 22, 1981 statement, this was an anomaly. Subsequent administrations, including George
H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, consistently used euphemisms like 'Meds Yeghern' (the Great Catastrophe), despite overwhelming historical evidence. This deliberate linguistic circumvention allowed the US to maintain strategic ties with Turkey, especially concerning airbases like Incirlik, while still theoretically acknowledging the suffering of Armenians. REPETITIONS:
The Erosion of Fact for Foreign Policy (1990s-2020) This pattern repeated relentlessly. In 1990, a congressional resolution recognizing the Armenian Genocide was withdrawn due to pressure from the Bush administration, citing concerns about harming relations with Turkey ( New York Times, 1990 ). Similar resolutions faltered throughout the 2000s, with successive presidents refusing to use the term.
President Obama, despite campaigning on a promise to recognize the genocide, notably shifted terminology once in office, adopting the standard cautious language. This consistent avoidance underscored a clear hierarchy: perceived strategic interests outweighed historical accuracy and moral imperatives. Turkey's lobbying efforts through organizations like the Turkish American Steering Committee