The Durable Narrative of Sectarian Violence
The ABC News report on the Islamabad mosque bombing, claiming at least 24 dead, highlights a recurring pattern of sectarian violence. Yet, a closer look at Pakistan's history reveals that such incidents are rarely spontaneous outbursts of religious hatred. Instead, they often align with geopolitical objectives, leveraging existing divisions to destabilize regions or justify interventions. Which
raises the question: who benefits from defining these atrocities as merely 'sectarian'? First Instance: The Zia-ul-Haq Era (1970s-1980s) The strategic instrumentalization of religious identity in Pakistan escalated dramatically under General Zia-ul-Haq's regime, following his 1977 coup. Seeking legitimacy and financial backing, Zia forged a powerful alliance with conservative religious factions,
particularly the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith schools of thought. This period saw the systematic 'Islamization' of state institutions and education, which included public funds diverting to madrassas promoting a stricter, often anti-Shiite, interpretation of Islam. The specific targeting of Shiite communities through legislation like the Hudood Ordinances (1979) and the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance
(1980) effectively marginalized Shiites, denying them representation and a share of state-collected alms, fueling resentment. This wasn't merely 'sectarianism'; it was state policy, subtly endorsed by international actors who saw Zia as a bulwark against Soviet influence in Afghanistan (CIA, c.1980s). Repetitions: The 1990s and Early 2000s This playbook was refined and repeated throughout the