The Art of the Zero-Sum Negotiation
Let's follow the trail: THE CLAIM: The New York Times article suggests that any future Trump-era deal with Iran would likely hinge on Iran's nuclear program being reduced to 'zero.' This implies a complete cessation of uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, or any activity that could be construed as having a dual-use capability. THE EVIDENCE: The call for 'zero' enrichment from Iran has been
a consistent demand from certain factions within the U.S. and its allies for decades. Notably, Benjamin Netanyahu has been warning the world about Iran being 'months from a nuclear bomb' since at least 2002. (Netanyahu, UN General Assembly, 2012; UN General Assembly, 2015; etc.). Despite continuous surveillance and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which rolled back its program
significantly, Iran has never achieved a nuclear weapon. THE CONTRADICTIONS: Curiously, this 'zero' standard is rarely, if ever, applied to other nations. For instance, NATO ally Turkey has a research reactor and has previously undertaken enrichment activities without facing the same existential pressure regarding 'zero' (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2018 reports). Japan, a signatory to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), possesses vast stockpiles of reprocessed plutonium – enough for thousands of bombs – yet does not face calls for 'zero' enrichment or reprocessing (Arms Control Association, 2023). One might wonder why Iran alone is expected to not only forego nuclear weapons (which it insists it has no intention of building, citing religious edicts) but also the capacity for