The Art of the Almost Sanction: A Masterclass in Deterrence Theater
CASE A: Taming Tehran via Tariff Teasers? Trump, per Bloomberg, 'enabled his administration to apply tariffs on goods from countries doing business with Iran, but stopped short of immediately imposing any new duties.' The stated rationale, of course, being that this creates 'maximum pressure.' One might wonder why, after years of rhetoric about crippling the Iranian economy, the lever isn't fully
pulled. Could it be that the fallout from actually sanctioning major global economies—like China, India, or Turkey, all of whom have significant trade ties with Tehran—would be far too disruptive to the US economy and alliances? Or perhaps, it's just good old-fashioned leverage, a bargaining chip kept warm for future (futile?) negotiations. CASE B: The 'Humanitarian' Exception Against Adversaries,
But Not Friends Consider, by contrast, the response to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The West, led by the US, moved with unprecedented speed to impose sweeping and immediate sanctions, impacting everything from SWIFT access to oligarchs' yachts. There was no 'enabling' of processes; it was a full-frontal economic assault, with little concern for the immediate blowback on global energy markets
or domestic inflation (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022). The framing around Russia was of an unprovoked aggressor requiring immediate, debilitating punishment. With Iran, despite decades of 'state sponsor of terror' rhetoric and renewed nuclear proliferation fears, the approach consistently appears to be one of calculated ambiguity, of keeping options open. The 1953 CIA-orchestrated coup