The Art of Blame Deflection
Netanyahu’s document, submitted to an ombudsman, argues that the intelligence failures preceding October 7th were 'deep-rooted' and systemic, asserting that his government was misled by military and intelligence assessments portraying Hamas deterrence as effective. He claims the 'concept of containment,' favored by previous administrations and intelligence bodies, was the fundamental error. This
framing positions him as an heir to flawed policies, rather than their architect or overseer, implying that the warnings he received were inaccurate or insufficient. Case A: The Current Blame Game In 2024, the Israeli Prime Minister’s office states that 'all echelons' underestimated Hamas and that the 'prevailing concept' was flawed, thereby implying systemic, rather than individual,
responsibility for intelligence failures leading to October 7th, 2023. By framing it as a 'concept of containment' failure, Netanyahu deflects from his own 15 years as Prime Minister, during which time Hamas’s capabilities demonstrably grew. His detailed 55-page document, released publicly, directly points to military and intelligence chiefs, as well as political rivals like former Prime Minister
Naftali Bennett. Case B: The Iraq WMD Debacle In 2003, the George W. Bush administration similarly deflected from intelligence failures regarding Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program. The official narrative, prominently amplified by outlets like The New York Times, focused on alleged 'intelligence failures' (The New York Times, 2004) rather than the manipulation of intelligence or the