Riyadh and Abu Dhabi: The Red Sea's New Scramble
THE ACTORS: Old Allies, New Rivals Saudi Arabia: Under MBS, Riyadh seeks to diversify its economy (Vision 2030) beyond oil, positioning itself as a logistics and trade hub. Its Red Sea Project and NEOM mega-city demand secure access and influence over the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Its political proxies include factions in Sudan (formerly Al-Burhan, now attempting to balance) and increasingly, certain
Somali federal state actors. United Arab Emirates: Led by MBZ, the UAE, particularly through DP World and various sovereign wealth funds, has aggressively invested in ports and logistics across the Horn. Its strategy is to control critical nodes in the global supply chain. Key allies include Somaliland (via the Berbera port deal) and significant influence within the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in
Sudan, even as it publicly pushes for a ceasefire (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, 2023). The United States: Operating often as an enabling, rather than direct, actor, Washington benefits from regional stability but frequently overlooks the long-term implications of allowing a bidding war for strategic assets. U.S. military bases (such as Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti) provide leverage but are
also vulnerable to regional power shifts engineered by its supposed allies. Israel: As the article briefly notes, Israel's "Abraham Accords" (2020) have cemented its ties with the UAE and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia. This provides a security dimension to the Red Sea competition, creating a de facto anti-Iran axis that also serves as a bulwark against other regional challengers to Saudi/UAE