Iran's Missile Endurance: Beyond Western Narratives of Depletion
The Financial Times, like many Western publications, questioned this week how long Iran could sustain its missile launches, implying a finite and easily depleteable arsenal. Their analysis, largely focused on a Western-centric model of military-industrial output, overlooks key aspects of Iran's self-sufficiency developed under decades of targeted sanctions. This framing conveniently omits several
crucial facts. Iran's missile program, driven by a national imperative for defense following the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and continued external threats, relies on extensive domestic production, often reverse-engineered or indigenously developed. Unlike nations dependent on foreign arms imports and dollar-denominated supply chains, Iran's cost base for missile production is significantly lower, and
its supply lines more resilient to external pressure. This strategy allows for continuous replenishment and expansion without the budgetary constraints faced by nations purchasing high-cost Western weaponry. The US military, for instance, in 2022 spent an estimated $1.5 million on each Patriot missile interceptor, a figure that dwarfs the production cost of many Iranian projectiles. This cost
asymmetry means Iran can manufacture and deploy a significant volume of missiles as a deterrent for a fraction of what an adversary might spend on air defense. The US has imposed over 100 rounds of sanctions on Iran since 1979, specifically targeting its defense industry, yet this has only accelerated Iran's drive toward self-reliance. This history parallels the 62-year-long embargo against Cuba,