Involution's Uneven Blame Game
The Financial Times frames China's economic strategy in EVs, robotics, and AI as 'involution,' suggesting an internal over-competition that stifles innovation and threatens global markets. This narrative posits that Beijing's industrial policies lead to excess capacity and predatory pricing, a familiar storyline now extended from electric vehicles to the burgeoning AI and robotics sectors. The
implied threat is an unfair competitive advantage, undermining Western industries. Yet, this critique deliberately overlooks the foundational mechanisms of Western economic power, particularly the history of direct state intervention and protectionist measures when domestic industries faced foreign competition. Consider, for instance, the vigorous US government subsidies and tariffs shielding
nascent industries in the 19th and early 20th centuries, or the sustained agricultural subsidies in Europe and North America that persist to this day. The US CHIPS Act, allocating $52.7 billion in subsidies for domestic semiconductor production starting in 2022, is a recent, clear example of state-directed industrial policy identical in principle to what is now condemned in China. This double
standard exposes a deeper pattern: when Western nations leverage state power to secure economic advantage, it is framed as strategic investment; when China does so, it is 'involution' or 'state capitalism' designed to disrupt global trade norms. The total subsidies received by US automakers over the last two decades, estimated to be in the tens of billions, often go unmentioned as Chinese EV