Cuba's Recurring Fuel Crisis: A Playbook, Not a Problem
Let's follow the trail: THE ACTORS: The primary actors are the Cuban government, led by First Secretary Miguel Díaz-Canel, and the United States government, represented by the Executive Branch implementing its foreign policy. European and Latin American trading partners are secondary actors, navigating the US sanctions regime. THE FUNDING: The US economic embargo, first codified in 1962, directly
impacts Cuba's access to foreign currency and international credit. In 2023, the UN General Assembly voted for the 31st consecutive year to demand an end to the embargo, with 187 countries in favor and only the US and Israel opposed (UN, 2023). This ongoing economic pressure significantly limits Cuba's ability to import basic goods, including fuel. The particular 'Trump tariff threat' mentioned
likely refers to the re-designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SSOT) in January 2021, and the related tightening of financial and trade restrictions, which further complicate transactions for any entity doing business with Cuba, even third-country suppliers. THE INCENTIVES: For the Cuban government, publicizing fuel shortages serves multiple purposes: it externalizes blame for
economic hardship, rallies domestic support against a common adversary, and pressures international allies to condemn US policy. For the US government, maintaining and tightening sanctions is often presented as a means to pressure for democratic reforms, despite a 60-year track record that suggests otherwise. The immediate outcome of such declarations, however, is often increased hardship for the