Conflict is a feature, not a bug, of 'nation-building'
The receipts speak for themselves: FIRST INSTANCE: The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 2005. The CPA, brokered by international actors, paved the way for South Sudan's 2011 independence. It was hailed as a triumph of diplomacy, but it notably left deep-seated ethnic and political divisions festering, essentially kicking the can down the road. The SPLM, the dominant force, consolidated
power, and the international community largely looked the other way, eager for their post-Cold War 'success story.' The US alone pumped billions into the region, framing it as humanitarian aid and development, yet a significant portion fueled a burgeoning military apparatus on both sides of the eventual split (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2010 reports). The outcome? A fragile state,
heavily reliant on oil revenue and foreign intervention. REPETITIONS: The 2013-2015 Civil War. Just two years after independence, South Sudan plunged into a brutal civil war, revealing the CPA's inherent flaws. The ‘international community’ reacted with hand-wringing and, predictably, more aid and peacekeeping missions. Curiously, this period also saw an uptick in arms sales to regional players,
often justified as 'stabilizing forces.' One might wonder why, if the goal was true stability, the structural issues that enabled conflict were never adequately addressed. The documented atrocities against civilians were appalling, yet the flow of resources, rather than fundamentally altering the power dynamics, seemed to reinforce existing patronage networks (Human Rights Watch, 2014).